The Court of Appeal, Abuja Division has set aside the judgment of the Federal High Court that nullified the Independent National Electoral Commission’s (INEC) revised timetable and schedule of activities for the 2027 general election.
The judgment, prepared by Justice Adebukola Banjoko and delivered by Justice Okon Abang, allowed INEC’s appeal against the judgment of the trial court in favour of the Youth Party (YP) delivered on May 20, 2026, by Justice Mohammed Umar and overturned the decision.
Justice Umar had granted all the reliefs sought by the Youth Party including orders nullifying the timelines contained in INEC’s revised election timetable relating to the conduct of party primaries, submission and replacement of candidates, publication of the final list of candidates and campaign schedules for the 2027 general election.
Dissatisfied with the decision, INEC headed to the Court of Appeal, challenging the entire judgment on nine grounds.
Delivering the lead judgment, Justice Abang held that the appeal was meritorious and succeeded on three independent but interrelated grounds.
The appellate court held that the trial judge failed to determine a fundamental limb of INEC’s preliminary objection challenging whether the respondent’s originating summons disclosed a reasonable cause of action.
According to the court, the objection was properly raised and argued and ought to have been determined before the substantive issues in the suit.
“The law imposes a duty on every court of law to pronounce upon every substantial issue properly submitted for adjudication. Failure to do so constitutes a violation of the constitutional guarantee of fair hearing,” the court held, relying on Supreme Court authorities.
The appellate court ruled that the omission rendered the proceedings fundamentally defective and liable to be set aside.
Secondly, the court held that the respondent failed to establish the requisite legal standing to institute the suit and observed that although the affidavit supporting the originating summons compared INEC’s timetable with the provisions of the Electoral Act, it failed to demonstrate that the respondent’s civil rights or legal obligations had been infringed or were under any imminent threat.
The court noted that there was no evidence showing that the respondent was prevented from conducting party primaries, nominating candidates, submitting nomination forms or exercising any legally protected right.
Rather, the affidavit disclosed only apprehensions and predictions regarding possible logistical inconveniences, which the court said were insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal High Court.
“Mere disagreement with the administrative position of a public authority like INEC does not, without more, confer legal standing,” the court held.
On the substantive issue, the Court of Appeal held that the constitutional power vested in INEC to organise, undertake and supervise elections necessarily includes the administrative authority to coordinate and regulate the sequence of electoral activities.
It also held that once the election dates fixed by INEC were not challenged, the commission was entitled to adopt administrative timelines necessary to actualise those dates, provided they remained within the statutory framework.
According to the court, interpreting the Electoral Act as compelling INEC to wait until the last statutory day before receiving nominations, processing substitutions or publishing candidates’ particulars would amount to substituting judicial preferences for the commission’s constitutionally vested administrative discretion.
“Where the Commission acts within the boundaries prescribed by the Constitution and the Electoral Act, the court has no licence to interfere merely because another administrative timetable might equally have been adopted,” the court held.
The appellate court further ruled that the respondent failed to establish the factual and legal foundation necessary for the declaratory reliefs granted by the trial court.
Consequently, it set aside the entire judgment of the Federal High Court and dismissed the respondent’s claims.
The appellate court declared that the originating summons was incompetent for want of locus standi and that, the respondent failed to establish any legal basis for the declaratory reliefs sought. It made no order as to costs.
In a concurring judgment, Justice Okon Abang agreed with the lead decision and emphasised that the phrase “not later than 120 days before the election” in the Electoral Act merely prescribes the latest permissible date for compliance and does not prohibit earlier compliance.
He held that the provision establishes a deadline rather than a fixed window, meaning political parties may validly submit candidates’ particulars before the 120-day threshold.
Justice Abang also held that the requirement for publication of the final list of candidates “at least 60 days before the election” equally permits earlier publication by INEC.
According to him, adopting the trial court’s interpretation would create practical difficulties for the commission in vetting candidates, preparing electoral materials and effectively conducting elections.
He held that INEC’s revised timetable did not amount to an unlawful amendment of the Electoral Act but represented a lawful exercise of its constitutional and statutory responsibilities.
It would be recalled that, Justice Umar had, in a ruling delivered in a suit marked, FHC/ABJ/CS/517/2026 filed by the Youth Party challenging several provisions in INEC’s timetable relating to party primaries, submission of candidates, replacement of candidates and campaign timelines for the 2027 elections on Wednesday, May 20, 2026, ordered the nullification of the time-frames imposed by the defendant (INEC) in its Revised Timetable and Schedule of Activities for 2027 General Election for the conduct of primary elections by political parties for the 2027 general elections, the submission of personal particulars of candidates by their political parties for the 2027 general elections, the withdrawal and replacement of candidates by political parties for the 2027 general elections, the publication of the final list of candidates for the 2027 general elections and campaigning for the 2027 general elections which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Electoral Act, 2026″.
Justice Umar ruled that INEC cannot lawfully abridge statutory timelines expressly provided under the Electoral Act 2026.
The court declared that Section 29(1) of the Electoral Act permits political parties to submit the personal particulars of their candidates not later than 120 days before an election, adding that INEC lacked the authority to impose a shorter deadline in its election timetable.
The judge further held that the commission could not shorten the 90-day period allowed under Section 31 of the Act for withdrawal and substitution of candidates.
The court also ruled that INEC does not possess the statutory authority to publish the final list of candidates earlier than the 60-day minimum period stipulated by law, holding that the commission lacked powers under Section 98 of the Electoral Act to impose such a timeline.
In another declaration, the court held that the timeframe prescribed by INEC for submission of membership registers for party primaries does not apply to primaries conducted to replace withdrawn candidates.
Consequently, the court set aside the affected portions of INEC’s revised timetable and schedule of activities for the 2027 general elections, describing them as inconsistent with the provisions of the Electoral Act 2026.
According to the court, “A declaration is hereby made that upon a proper consideration and interpretation of the provisions of Sections 29, 82 and 84(1) of the Electoral Act, 2026, the powers of the defendant to receive notice of party primaries and the personal particulars of candidates, and its duty to attend, observe and monitor such primaries, does not extend to fixing or prescribing the timetable within which political parties may conduct their primary elections for the purpose of nominating candidates for the 2027 general elections.
“A Declaration is made that having regards to Section 29(1) of the Electoral Act, 2026 which requires political parties to submit the personal particulars of their candidates not later than 120 days to an election, the defendant cannot lawfully abridge or limit that statutory period by prescribing a shorter timeframe in its 2027 election timetable.
“A Declaration is made that, having regards to Section 31 of the Electoral Act, 2026 which permits political parties to withdraw and substitute candidates not later than 90 days to the conduct of an election, the defendant cannot lawfully abridge or limit that statutory period by fixing earlier deadline for the withdrawal and replacement of candidates in its 2027 election timetable.
“A Declaration is made that having regards to Section 32 of the Electoral Act, 2026, the defendant does not possess the statutory power to publish the final list of candidates for the 2027 general election before the 60 days minimum period prescribed by law.
“A Declaration is, made that upon a proper construction of Section 98 of the Electoral Act, 2026, the defendant does not possess the statutory authority to fix in its timetable for the 2027 general elections for campaign to end 2 days before the elections.
“A Declaration is made that upon a proper interpretation to Section 33 of the Electoral Act, 2026, the time frame prescribed by the defendant for submission of membership registers for the conduct of primary elections is not applicable to primary elections conducted for the purpose of replacing withdrawn candidates”, the court held.
INEC had scheduled the presidential and National Assembly elections for January 16, 2027, while governorship and state Houses of Assembly elections are slated for February 6, 2027.
END
Comments